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I - The economic context 
After three decades of sustained growth, Brazil was 
seen at the end of the 70's as one of the few successful expe- 
riences of economic development based on import-substitution 
policies. Heavy industrialization accelerated in the last de- 
cade with the production of capital goods and basic inputs. 
Modernization of agricuiture occurred through various agro-in- 
dustrial complexes and rural-urban migration continued as high 
as in the previous decades. The growing cities were in condi- 
tion to offer employment opportunities to the majority of mi- 
grants who, in general, were able to match the new requirements 
of an urban-industrial society. 
In addition to the high rate of labour absorption in 
the modern sectors, either industries or services, a quite ef- 
fective trickle-down mechanism suggested that, inspite of the 
enormous disparities, social and economic integration, albeit 
sluggish, could be foreseen as long as growth woula go on. 
The external debt crisis put an halt to this process 
The 80's brought recession, instability and uncertainty about 
a future that was almost already there. 
The 1981-84 recession was very deep. Real wages felt 
circa 25/30%. Hundreds of thousands lost their jobs in indus- 
try and had to accept work under informal conditions or face 
eee i ' NE so ys tye. 
open unemployment which, for the first time, i appeared as an im- 
‘portant. problem. 
Bt During and‘after 1984; the Brazilian economy experji- 
enced a recovery, first pulled’ by exports, followed in 1986 by 
a feverish’ expansion of the 4 internal ma — j 
1 oes rket in great 
part a
consequence of the stabilization plan — but did not manage to 
recover the previous "Japanese" investment rate (24% of GNP). 
Government and foreign savings vanished and so did confidence 
in future. Brazil grew suddenly old. 
Our purpose in the following pages is to sketch first 
the Brazilian experience on trade unionism and collective bar- 
gaining, then the recent developments in labour relations, and, 
finally, the new regime's frustrated concertation intent (*). 
II - Trade Unions in Brazil — a Historical Perspective 
The first aspect to notice in a historical perspecti- 
ve is the pale performance of Brazilian trade unions in collec- 
tive bargaining, at least until the middle of the 70's. This 
weakness manifested itself through small participation of wor- 
kers in union's rank and file, and through scarce legitimate 
representation. These cannot be explained only by underdevelop 
ment, but were due to conscious aims of state regulated labour 
relations. In order to understand it, we must take into ac- 
count the political dimensions of the question, that is, the 
role of the Brazilian state in controlling economic institutions 
and unions through corporative laws. It is not an overstatement 
to say that the state determined those who can and those who 
cannot perform as parters in distributive conflicts. --Répresenta 
tion has to be sanctioned by a traditionally bureaucratic ‘ang. 
authoritatian state. 
 
(*) We will base our exposition of, parts of a report coordinated by us eat | 
year at the Institute of Industrial Economics/Federal University of Rio 
de Janeiro: "The Brazilian Labour Market". The relevant parts of that 
repport were written by Vera Pereira and Maria Herminia Tavares de 
Almeida. 
     
cheap-labour. With a completely free Market . ae me 
Labour relations institutions are characterized main- 
ly by monopoly of representation on a territorial base; denial 
until recently of horizontal organizations — both favouring 
athomised action — compulsory union tax aimed to finance coop- 
tation through social assistance by the unions; organizational 
design of the unions imposed from the top; the state's power to 
intervene and by the important role attributed to Labour Justice 
in arbitration, disguising the heavy hand of the state with the 
veil of labour legislation. In sum, the state, after 1930, was 
not a mere intermediary between capital and labour, but the are 
na in which these relations developed. Labour market ene 
took place in the offices of the Ministry of Labour. Labour 
rights, like regional minimum wages, were granted against the 
sacrifice of free labour unions. Rank and file was not really 
mobilized by autonomous organizations, but coopted by formal 
unions whose main purpose was to colaborate with the state. 
Employers associations were not different in nature, and dele- 
gated to the state the power to regulate labour relations. 
It is amazing that, inspite of the intense industria- 
lization process, these rules and institutions showed great sta 
bility. They last 50 years. through different 
political regimes, populist and authoritarian ones, 
In this respect, two aspects should be kept in mind 
_ First, that State-regulated unionism was not completely against 
workers interests. The first stages of industrialization we woe ; : re 
  
“4,.marked by.the disposal of unlimited supply of desorganized and 
certainly things 
would be worse for the workers, Entployers would resist i ; or i . more 
easily to pressures So, inspi : ' Spite of the cor i porative charact er
of unionism, some achievements must be credited to it. O
ther- 
wise, it would be difficult to understand why the pledges 
for 
autonomy, internal democracy and legitimate rep
resentation were 
not major issues until recently. Although union leadersh
ip 
lacked legitimation in a more liberal sense, it had a warranted 
seat in government decision-making process in relatio
n to wa- 
ges, social security and working conditions. 
Second, corporativism did not inhibit autonomous move 
ments and strikes which grew in number and scope with inflation 
at the end of the 50's until the military coup in 1964. 
Therefore, due to the priviledged formal positions of 
leadership in state departments, it was not easy (although the 
law permitted it), up to 64, to intervene in autonomos strike movements. 
Labour Justice, as usual also in other countries, judged favour 
ably to labour in 
not few cases. The 
legal minimum Wage 
= a - 
strong social standard in all wage negotiations at the time — 
experienced real growth until the end of the 50's 
The 1964 military coup undercutted the rising influen- 
ce of union leadership in government decisions, and, in addition i ’ 
the level of minimum wages never again recuperated their 1957/ 
59 values. 
The military had no reason to change the labour legis- a” 
lation. They just had to apply it in its taugher aspects. And 
they abused of them. Without adding a single paragraph, strikes A 
could come to a standstill and leadership changed. ‘The-résurt 
was an emptyness of labour representation at etnvesiavalll But, 
not satisfied, they did change some articles in labour legisla- 
=) jal 
tion that turned dismissals easier,.a strong device in éoneeore ! 
ling wages and in weakening labour's bargaining ,power.° Working 
‘edly, this was a tendency. Undoubtedly, also 
t 
“though not: a.complete reversal. 
‘.tituted by a more modern one. Probably 
' 
conditions deteriorated rapidly under the military regime 
As a response to these eircimetancds and also as a 
consequence of node Entaation and labour concentration in big 
plants, a strong movement emerged in the 70's in So Paulo, 
called New Unionism. Strong enough at the end of the decade to 
bypass wage legislation in many cases. Both, employers and 
workers seemed to be of a new kind and often preferred to nego- 
tiate directly without state mediation. Criticism of state 
intervention in labour relations no longer belonged solely to 
left wing discourse but creeped also into business. This criti 
cism could not be isolated from criticism of authoritarianism i 
as a whole. 
III - Recent Developments 
Together with the fading out of the military regime, 
it seemed that the whole structure of state-corporate unionism 
would crumble down. Mechanisms of control were not working any 
more, not even at the firm's side. Business developed new forms 
of association, mainly by broad branches of activities (basic 
industries, electric and electronics, etc.) not envisaged by 
state regulations, 
The modernization of the economy was finally makin g 
its way through (obsolete?) corporative legislation Undoubt - ou = 
the economic 
erisis of the. eighties was an inflection in this pro cess, al- 
De facto, there was, at the 
De jure, it 
is not clear yet if-the ola le gislation will be xr adically sub s- 
end of HE military regime a more liberal] climat 
ei. 
the new constitution
will introduce some substantial changes in industrial relations 
structure, specially in regard to trade union organizations, 
degree of authonomy and conditions on strikes. As the consti- 
tutional process has not yet come to an end, we prefer not to 
comment on it. 
After 1980, the numbers of unions and workers as- 
sociated grew strongly. Notwithstanding, the degree of effec- 
tive participation is still low — less than 20% of urban la- 
bour-force, 
Restricted at the beginning to the more technological 
ly advanced sectors, the new practices experienced rapid dif- 
fusion, inclusive and remarkably among middle class segments 
linked to public services (health and education mainly) (*). The 
civil transition government still has the legal power to inter- 
vene but the political atmosphere, until now, would not recom- 
mend it. On the other hand, vested interests in corporativism, 
also among unionists, are strong enough to impair advances in 
legislation. 
Nevertheless, direct negotiations have spread, mainly 
at plant level, becoming more important than justice arbitra- 
tion, at least for the more organized workers. The agenda of 
negotiations includes nowadays many social items in addition to 
wage claims, and strikes as a pressure device, inspite of heavy 
legal restrictions still existent, does not provoke panic any- 
more. 
a 
(*) Public servants’ strikes are ilegal, but they have occurred frequently: 
Different from the majority of workers' st-ikesa, those tend to last 
longer due to the fact that no costs are involved, s2rce the partici- 
pants continue to receive their payments: :   
Three national associations of unions were created 
(recently legalised) and informal represent.tion at plant level 
widely accepted, but far from being legally recognised. 
Because of the diminishing real value of minimum wa- 
ge, Claims for basic wage rate by category became of utmost im- 
portance, followed by demands for more frequent readjustments 
in face of inflation (*) and for limitations on "unjustified" 
lay-offs. Some kind of job stability is also a, majorclainm.. 
At least in the more modern and larger firms, minimum 
wage today lost its previous importance, but it is still a stan 
dard to weaker categories. . Certainly, one of the biggest 
frustrations of the transition period is that it was unable to 
reverse its falling tendency. 
Only recently demands concerning awareness about the social 
effects of technologic:1 innovations became part of the agen- 
das, but there is no remarkable: concession to be registered un- 
til now in this matter. Also worth of noticing is the upsurge 
and the number of strikes performed by rural workers (**), 
Table below shows paralisations (in thousands of men/days) by 
broad categories in 1986 (***); 
 
Categories ist semester 2nd semester 
Public Servants 6329 7818 
Industry 1985 3795 
Banking 5 
544 
Rural Workers 2559 2444 
Others 1546 
16S8 
fotal 15924 16249  
Source: Ministry of Labour. 
 
(*) Today, with a monthly rate of mensletion a 
every month. round 20%, wages are readjusted 
(**) Rural unionism . got momentum by the end of the 60's 
(***) Circa 50% of the strikes. took place in Sado Paulo, the. most 
region, with about 20% of the Brazilian labour force developed
IV - An Intent of Concertation 
Since 1984, the topic of concertation (and/or Social 
Pact) came to discussion in Brazil. In advanced, more homoge- 
neous, capitalist democracies, concertation has a precise mean- 
ing, which includes some kind of agreement about income distri- 
bution but, definitely, it does not include negotiations about 
political or economic institutions, like private property of 
land for instance. These latter issues were firmly establish- 
ed long ago (*). 
In Brazil, as in other Latinamerican countries, the 
agenda of an eventual concertation process could become so di- 
versified, since even some basic institutions are object of dis 
sent, that its meaning turns quite ambiguous and its success 
feasibility rather difficult. On the other hand, it is by no 
means clear who should sit at the concertation table. 
In spite of the enormous obstacles, the project of a 
democratic transition period, where decisions would be based on 
a broad political negotiation, was present with Tancredo Neves. 
He had enough political support to Propose and to foster such 
an ambitious project. Unfortunately, it was buried with him, 
Sarney's main preoccupation, on the contrary, has been to build 
his political support. In so far, he lacked a firm basis to 
Promote, effectively, a social pact, although the rethoric of 
it remained until the beqinning of 1987. To tackle the tense 
situation caused by the failure of the stabilization program-_ ga Peaks) 
me (Plano Cruzado) at the end of 1986, Sarney tried, through J SM : 





(*) Spain is an exception, 
(*) The cuT, one of the three labour-union associations, 
policies concerning such broad issuesias prices and wages adjust 
ments, a desirable rate of growth of GNP {sic) and alternatives 
to cope with the services of external debt, among others. It 
was, of course, doomed to failure. We do not have to go here 
into details of the unsuccess. Sufficient is to say that, as 
mentioned, the agenda had to include too many points if all part 
But, ners, considered as important, were to participate. again, t 
who are the important, or legitimate partrers after all? Who 
Who represents the workers? And so represents the employers? 
forth (*). 
In this moment, once again, Brazil faces the possibili 
ty of hiperinflation with recession. A scenario that would bad- 
ly need some kind of concertation. But none of the inhibiting 
factors that were present a year ago have disappeared, 
hegemonic in many of, the most advanced sectors, refused to participate, Since Sao Paulo! powerful Federation of Industries was more interested i ie 
; 
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